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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
GREGORY F. McCRACKEN, 
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Civil File No. 11-3480 (MJD/JJK)
CARLETON COLLEGE,
Defendant.
Jeffrey D. Schiek and Philip G. Villaume, Villaume & Schiek, P.A., Counsel for 
Plaintiff.
Daniel G. Wilczek and Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Counsel 
for Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [Docket No. 10] The Court heard oral argument on June 7, 2013. For 
the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's 
motion.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. The Parties
Plaintiff Gregory F. McCracken ("McCracken") was hired as a custodian at 
Carleton College in 1970. (Compl. ^ 4.) Carleton is a liberal arts college in 
Northfield, Minnesota. (Id. at ^ 2.) Carleton's Facilities Department maintains 
the campus grounds and buildings. The Facilities Department employed eight 
supervisors and/or managers. (Ex. H to Kruckeberg Aff., McCracken Dep. Ex. 3.)
McCracken held various positions during his forty years of employment. 
(Ex. A to Kruckeberg Aff., McCracken Dep. 27:12-28:5.) At the time of his 
discharge, McCracken was a Maintenance Supervisor and supervised eleven 
employees. (Id. at 43:1-5, 46:14-19.)
Carleton terminated McCracken's employment on April 27, 2011. (Id. at 
179:21-180:12.) At that time, Kirk Campbell, the Director of Maintenance, was 
McCracken's direct supervisor, and Steven Spehn, the Director of Facilities, was 
Campbell's direct supervisor. (Id. 38:10-14; Ex. C to Kruckeberg Aff., Spehn Dep. 
5:22-6:5.) The Director of Facilities reports to Carleton's Vice President and 
Treasurer, Fred Rogers.
2
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2. McCracken's Employment Concerns in 2006
In April 2006, McCracken believed that his job was in jeopardy. 
(McCracken Dep. Ex. 15; McCracken Dep. 138:3-22.) He met with Vice President 
Rogers to discuss his concerns about his job. (McCracken Dep. Ex. 15; 
McCracken Dep. 138:13-25.) McCracken also raised concerns about Richard 
Strong, who at that time was Director of Facilities. (McCracken Dep. 72:17-73:3, 
138:23-25.) McCracken stated that Strong was too focused on sustainable 
building methods and not on departmental needs, and that Strong proceeded 
with construction of a wind turbine project without obtaining county approval 
for the footing drawings. (Id. at 74:1-13.) McCracken also stated that Strong was 
threatening Campbell and another employee by making their jobs more difficult. 
(Id. at 74:13-14, 75:19-76:11.) McCracken asked Vice President Rogers to 
investigate. (Id. at 74:16-17.)
Strong was terminated in May 2006. (Compl. ^ 6.) McCracken believed 
that Strong was fired as a direct result of Vice President Rogers' investigation. 
(McCracken Dep. 74:22-75:13.) Carleton hired Spehn as the Director of Facilities 
in November 2006. (Spehn Dep. 5:22-6:5.)
3. McCracken's Job Performance
3
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During the time that Campbell was McCracken's direct supervisor, 
McCracken had daily contact with Campbell. (Ex. F to Kruckeberg Aff., 
Campbell Dep. 9.) On April 9, 2007, McCracken received a positive performance 
evaluation from his supervisor Campbell. (Compl. ^ 10.) However, at the end of 
2007, Campbell was dissatisfied with aspects of McCracken's job performance. 
(Campbell Dep. 51:9-52:18, 53:23-54:7.) Campbell was concerned that McCracken 
was not conducting building audits, which consisted of walking through 
buildings on campus to determine maintenance needs and writing work orders 
for those tasks. (Id. at 45:24-47:15.) Campbell had previously counseled 
McCracken on the need to perform these audits for years. (Id.) Campbell 
created what he termed a "recipe" for improving McCracken's performance of 
the building tours, which included directions on how to conduct the audits and 
frequency at which he should conduct the audits. (Id. at 48:13-49:11.)
McCracken's failure to perform the audits was documented in his 2008, 
2010, and 2011 performance appraisals. (Id. at 49:25-55:7, 57:1-58:3; Campbell 
Dep. Ex. 1-3.) In February 2011, Carleton issued McCracken a written warning 
for refusing to take the new Environmental Health and Safety Compliance 
Manager on building tours. (McCracken Dep. 140:1-15.) McCracken informed
4
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his supervisor and the new manager that he "did not do social tours." 
(McCracken Dep. 140:16-25, 141:7-18; McCracken Dep. Ex. 16; Ex. E to 
Kruckeberg Aff., Haase Dep. 6:11-20, 19:20-20:16.) After he received the written 
warning, he performed the tours as instructed and testified that he understood 
the reason he was assigned that duty. (McCracken Dep. 146:20-148:1.)
4. McCracken's Continued Employment Concerns 
McCracken's concerns about losing his job continued in to February 2009. 
At this time, he stopped making payments on the first and second mortgages on 
his home to prepare for the anticipated loss of income if he lost his job. 
(McCracken Dep. 14:12-25.) McCracken believed that Vice President Rogers was 
out to get him, and that Campbell's critiques and warnings were really messages 
from Rogers, who wanted to terminate his employment. (Id. at 99:9-16.) 
Campbell testified that the goal of the warnings and evaluations was to improve 
McCracken's performance. (Id. at 72:12-14.)
In April 2009, McCracken met with Joanne Mullen, Carleton's 
Ombudsperson,1 to discuss his concerns about Rogers. (Ex. G to Kruckeberg
1 The Ombudsperson is a confidential, impartial, independent and non­
adversarial alternative for constructive dialogue and resolution of work-related
5
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Aff., Mullen Dep. 5:24-6:5; McCracken Dep. 71:3-25.) McCracken informed 
Mullen that he felt that Rogers did not like him and that Rogers treated him 
unfairly. (McCracken Dep. 71:3-25.) McCracken also stated that he believed 
Rogers was retaliating against him because of their conversation three years 
earlier about former employee Strong. (Id. at 194:10-15.) McCracken thought he 
made Rogers look bad because Rogers was Strong's supervisor. (Id. at 91:22­
92:10.) McCracken also thought Rogers was retaliating against him because of 
his age or weight. (Id. at 114:10-115:7.) Mullen agreed to keep McCracken's 
concerns confidential per her standard practice and discussed McCracken's idea 
to present his concerns directly to then Carleton President Rob Oden. (Id. 83:14­
84:2.)
In June 2009, McCracken met with Oden. (Id. at 93:13-94:18.) After this 
meeting, Oden told Rogers that McCracken was concerned about his 
employment. (Ex. D to Kruckeberg Aff., Rogers Dep. 28:3-19, 29:14-23.) At this 
time, Carleton was in the middle of discussions regarding possible reductions in 
force due to budget issues. (Id.) Oden told Rogers that Carleton should not 
pursue any disciplinary action against McCracken at that time. (Id.) Rogers had
problems and conflicts at Carleton. (Mullen Dep. 6:13-25; McCracken Dep. Ex. 
6.)
6
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little interaction with McCracken, but he was aware that Spehn and Campbell 
had considered disciplining McCracken because of complaints to Human 
Resources regarding McCracken's bullying of his employees. (Id. at 29:6, 30:3-10; 
Spehn Dep. 18:12-19:9.) Following Oden's instructions, Spehn and Campbell did 
not discipline McCracken. (Spehn Dep. 18:18-23.)
In January 2011, McCracken reported to Campbell that he witnessed one 
employee stealing air filters from a Carleton vehicle and putting them into his 
personal vehicle. (McCracken Dep. 221:13-223:17.) Campbell in turn reported 
this information to Spehn. (Id. at 223:18-20, 224:3-10.) The employee received a 
warning letter stating that he was not to take property from Carleton without 
receiving advance permission. (Cardenas Aff. ^ 3.)
McCracken identifies the April 2009 report to Mullen, the June 2009 report 
to Oden, and the January 2011 report to Campbell as his whistleblower reports. 
[Docket No.16, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment]
5. McCracken's Medical History
In March 2007, McCracken was referred to a psychiatrist by his medical 
doctor to cope with job-related stress. (Compl. ^ 8.) McCracken testified that he 
had a history of depression that dated back to 1994. (McCracken Dep. 24.)
7
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On July 1, 2009, McCracken received a pacemaker implant in his heart. 
(Compl. ^ 39.) McCracken believed that his heart failed as a result of stress 
caused by the harassment at work. (Id. OT at 15-16.) McCracken returned to 
work on July 13, 2009 with no work restrictions or any requests for reasonable 
accommodation. (McCracken Dep. 174:11-13; Ex. L to Kruckeberg Aff.)
In August 2010, McCracken hear a pop in his left knee while working at 
home in his yard. (McCracken Dep. Ex. 22.) McCracken sought treatment for his 
knee in October 2010 in anticipation of an upcoming vacation. (McCracken Dep. 
201:10-13, 204:16-20; McCracken Dep. Ex. 22.) McCracken was diagnosed with a 
possible tear in his meniscus, and McCracken's doctor gave him the cortisone 
shot he requested, but the doctor did not provide any work restrictions. 
(McCracken Dep. 150:10-23, 151:22-25.)
McCracken reported his numerous physical disabilities, including his knee 
injury, placement of pacemaker, depression, and diabetes, to his supervisor, 
Campbell. (Campbell Dep. 23-24.)
6. The Ombudsperson's Workplace Assessment of the Facilities 
Department
In the later part of 2010 and early 2011, Mullen and Kerstin Cardenas, 
Carleton's Human Resource Director, noticed an increase in the number of
8
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complaints from Facilities Department employees who were concerned about 
their working environment. (Mullen Dep. 22:9-23:10, 54:2-12; Ex. B to 
Kruckeberg Aff., Cardenas Dep. 35:9-36:6, McCracken Dep. 56:17-23.) Cardenas 
and Spehn, in consultation with Mullen, decided to conduct an assessment of the 
Department in early 2011 in order to evaluate the reported concerns and 
determine whether the complaints were old complaints based on what happened 
in the past or if they were new complaints based on the current operation of the 
department. (Mullen Dep. 54:2-12; Cardenas Dep. 35:9-36:6; Cardenas Aff. ^ 3.)
Mullen interviewed a broad group of employees. Mullen interviewed all 
the managers and supervisors in the Department and a large group of non­
supervisory employees. (McCracken Dep. Ex. 3.) The non-supervisory 
employees included both individuals who did and did not voice concerns about 
the Facilities Department. (Mullen Dep. 28:14-29:1, 44:11-18, 58:4-11.)
McCracken and Campbell were among the interviewees. (McCracken Dep. 58:4­
11; Mullen Dep. 29:2-4, 43:2-6.)
Mullen prepared two written reports dated April 3, 2011, summarizing the 
results of the assessment. (McCracken 58:12-15; McCracken Ex. 3.) One version 
of the report included comments about Human Resources. (McCracken Ex. 3.)
9
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This is the only version before the Court. Many of the complaints focused on 
McCracken and Campbell. McCracken acknowledged that he used strong 
language with his employees, but he felt it was justified. (McCracken Dep. 65:20­
66:11.)
Cardenas and Spehn reviewed Mullen's report and met with her to discuss 
a course of action. (Mullen Dep. 39:7-22.) Mullen recommended to Cardenas 
and Spehn that Carleton terminate the employment of McCracken and Campbell. 
(Id. at 40:11-23.) Mullen met with Cardenas and Spehn for a second time and 
Rogers joined the meeting. Mullen presented the same recommendation and 
also stated that Spehn could not maintain credibility if McCracken and Campbell 
remained employed. (Mullen Dep. 40:16-23, 41:11-19.) Based on Mullen's 
recommendation, Cardenas, Spehn, and Rogers decided to terminate the 
employment of McCracken and Campbell. (Id. at 39:7-40:2; McCracken Dep. 
178:24-179:13, 179:21-180:12.)
7. McCracken's Termination
On April 26, 2011, Plaintiff was honored for his forty years of service to 
Carleton College. (Compl. ^ 25.) Spehn did not want to deprive McCracken of 
recognition for the years he had worked at Carleton by accelerating the planned
10
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termination. (Ex. J to Kruckeberg Aff.) Therefore, Spehn waited to terminate 
MCracken's employment until after the ceremony. (Id.) On April 27, 2011, after 
forty years of service to Carleton, Carleton terminated McCracken and Campbell. 
(Campbell Dep. 8-9.) At that time, McCracken was sixty years old and Campbell 
was sixty-two years old. (McCracken Dep. 11; Campbell Dep. 26.) Carleton did 
not immediately replace McCracken because it determined that his duties could 
be absorbed by others. (Cardenas Dep. 38:5-11.) On May 28, 2012, Carleton 
hired Brian Lee, who was forty-five years old, at the time, as Maintenance 
Supervisor. (Spehn Dep. 31; Cardenas Dep. 38:5-11.)
B. Procedural Background
On or about October 31, 2011, McCracken filed a Complaint against 
Carleton in the Minnesota District Court, Third Judicial District, Rice County.
The Complaint alleges: Count One: disability discrimination in violation of state 
law; Count Two: age discrimination in violation of state law; Count Three: 
retaliation discrimination in violation of state law; Count Four: whistle blower 
violation in violation of state law; Count Five: retaliation violation of the whistle 
blower law in violation of state law; Count Six: disability discrimination in 
violation of federal law; Count Seven: age discrimination in violation of federal
11
CASE 0:11-cv-03480-MJD-JJK Document 21 Filed 08/26/13 Page 12 of 30
law; and Count Eight: retaliation discrimination in violation of federal law.
On November 30, 2011, Carleton removed the lawsuit to this Court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Carleton now moves for summary judgment on all 
counts.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party seeking 
summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no disputed issue 
of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Summary judgment is only appropriate 
when "there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." 
Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
B. Merits of Age Discrimination Claims
1. The ADEA and MHRA Standards 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(a)(1) and 631(a) prohibits discrimination against employees over the age
12
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of 40. Similarly, the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, subd. 2(2)(3), prohibits an employer from making adverse 
employment decisions against an employee on the basis of the employee's age. 
Claims arising under the MHRA are considered under the same analysis as 
claims arising under the ADEA. Lewis v. St. Cloud State Univ., 467 F.3d 1133, 
1138 (8th Cir. 2006).
A claim under the ADEA may be proved by direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Id. Where there is a lack of direct evidence of discrimination, a claim 
of age discrimination is analyzed by using the burden-shifting analysis set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Chambers v. 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
Under this framework, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. Id. If Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to Defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. 
Id. Finally, if Defendant can articulate a non-discriminatory reason for 
discharging Plaintiff, the burden shifts again to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
reason articulated by Defendant is actually a pretext for age discrimination. Id.
2. Prima Facie Claim
13
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The elements of a prima facie claim of age discrimination are: 1) Plaintiff 
was over the age of 40 years; 2) he was qualified for his position; 3) he suffered 
an adverse employment action; and 4) he was replaced by someone substantially 
younger him. McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted).
The Court finds that on this record, Plaintiff has put forth evidence to 
establish a prima facie case. It is undisputed that McCracken was over the age of 
40, that he suffered an adverse employment action when his employment was 
terminated, and that he was replaced by someone substantially younger than 
him. McCracken was sixty years old and a forty-year employee of Carleton 
when his employment was terminated, and Carleton replaced him with a forty- 
five year old man.
With regard to the second element of Plaintiff's prima facie case, whether 
Plaintiff was qualified, this Court must keep in mind that the burden is not 
intended to be onerous. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 
(1981). The record before the Court shows that up until 2007, McCracken's 
performance evaluations were positive. McCracken's performance evaluations in 
2008, 2010, and 2011, however, included negative evaluations relating to his
14
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performance of building audits. The record further demonstrates that 
McCracken's supervisor believed that McCracken could not perform these 
building audits due to health issues. McCracken received further instruction 
from his supervisor on the building audits and a written warning for refusing to 
conduct a building tour in 2011. McCracken subsequently performed his duties 
as instructed. There is no evidence in the record before the Court that 
McCracken received any other negative performance evaluations. Viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the record indicates that 
McCracken met expectations and the Court finds that he has met his minimal 
burden of establishing that he was performing his job adequately. Therefore, 
McCracken has put forth a prima facie case of age discrimination.
3. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Termination 
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff. 
Lewis, 467 F.3d at 1137. Carleton maintains that it had a legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason for terminating McCracken. Carleton states that it 
terminated McCracken based on Mullen's recommendation to terminate his 
employment following her assessment of the Facilities Department, which was
15
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conducted due to an increase in complaints from Facilities Department 
employees.
The Court finds that Carleton met its burden and now the burden shifts to 
McCracken to demonstrate that this proffered reason was actually pretext for age 
discrimination.
4. Pretext
Once a defendant has articulated a non-discriminatory reason the plaintiff 
must show that the stated reason is in fact pretextual. Lewis, 467 F.3d at 1137. 
"At this stage, [McCracken] can avoid summary judgment only if the evidence 
considered in its entirety (1) created a fact issue as to whether [Carleton's] 
proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) created a reasonable inference that age 
was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision." Id.
To carry this burden of showing pretext, a plaintiff must show that the 
proffered justification for the adverse employment action is unworthy of 
credence. Erickson v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2001). The 
methods which a plaintiff may use to demonstrate pretext include:
(1) demonstrating that the proffered reason has no basis in fact,
(2) demonstrating that the action the employer took was contrary to a policy or
16
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practice, (3) showing that it is unlikely that the employer would have acted on 
the proffered reason, and (4) providing evidence of a discriminatory attitude in 
the workplace. Id. at 727. However, courts do not sit as "super personnel 
departments" and should not substitute their own judgments for those made by 
employers, except to the extent that those judgments involved intentional 
discrimination. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 
1995).
The Court finds that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether 
Defendant's reasons for terminating Plaintiff are a pretext for age discrimination. 
Carleton maintains that it terminated McCracken based on Mullen's 
recommendation to Cardenas, Spehn, and Rogers following her assessment of 
the Facilities Department. The Court, however, finds that there are many issues 
of fact relating to the assessment of the Facilities Department that prevent the 
Court from granting summary judgment in Carleton's favor. For example, there 
are fact questions as to whether the complaints voiced during Mullen's employee 
interviews relate to the current operation of the department, whether the 
complaints were in response to prior discipline of employees by the Plaintiff of 
another supervisor, or whether the complaints were related to ongoing contract
17
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negotiation issues. There are also fact questions as to the truth and veracity of 
information gleaned during the interviews as there is no indication in the record 
that McCracken was given an opportunity to respond. Further, there are fact 
questions relating to Carleton's interpretation and application of Mullen's report. 
Mullen's recommendation was that "[t]here needs to be change within the 
Facilities Department." (Ex. H to Kruckeberg Aff., Ex. 3 to McCracken Dep.) The 
report identifies numerous personnel-, procedural-, and practice-based problems 
and identifies additional individual supervisors by name. However, in the 
record before the Court, there is only evidence that a sixty-year old employee 
with forty years of service and a second employee who was sixty-two years old 
were terminated. Given these genuine issues of fact, McCracken's age at the time 
of his termination and his forty-year term of service at Carleton, the Court denies 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the age discrimination claims.
C. Merits of Disability Discrimination Claims
1. The ADAAA and MHRA Standards
The ADA protects "any qualified individual with a disability" from 
discrimination based on that disability. Phillip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 
1023 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The ADA Amendments Act of
18
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2008 ("ADAAA") was signed into law on September 25, 2008, and became 
effective on January 1, 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-325. Because the conduct allegedly 
giving rise to McCracken's claims occurred after that date, the amended version 
of the ADA applies. See Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 734 n.4 
(8th Cir. 2010).
Likewise, the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2, prohibits an employer 
from making adverse employment decisions against an employee on the basis of 
the employee's disability. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. Claims arising under 
the MHRA are considered under the same analysis as claims arising under the 
ADAAA. See Kobus v. Coll. of St. Scholastica, Inc., 608 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 
2010) ("Apart from one difference not relevant here, an MHRA claim proceeds 
the same way as does a claim under the ADA."); see also Kammueller v. Loomis, 
Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 ("The MHRA 'materially limits' standard is less 
stringent than the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 'substantially limits' 
standard.").
A claim under the ADAAA may be proved by direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Bliss v. Morrow Enterprises, Inc., Civil No. 09-cv-3064C (PJS/JJK), 2011 
WL 2555365, at *5 (D. Minn. June 28, 2011). Where there is a lack of direct
19
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evidence of discrimination, a claim of disability discrimination is analyzed by 
using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Norman v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 606 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2010); Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 
F.3d 435, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007). Under McDonnell Douglas, McCracken must 
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Dovenmuehler, 509 F.3d at 
439. The burden then shifts to Carleton to articulate a legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. Finally, McCracken must show that 
Carleton's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id.
2. Prima Facie Claim
The following three elements comprise a prima facie claim of disability 
discrimination: (1) that Plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of the 
ADAAA; (2) that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with 
or without reasonable accommodation; and, (3) that he suffered an adverse 
employment action because of his disability. Dovenmuehler, 509 F.3d at 439; 
Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 517 (8th Cir. 2003).
a. Disabled
With respect to the first element of the prima facie claim, the ADAAA 
defines disability in the following three ways: "(A) a physical or mental
20
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impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
The Court finds that there is evidence in the record that indicates that 
McCracken suffered from depression and anxiety, sustained a knee injury, and 
used a pacemaker. When viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
McCracken, the Court finds that he meets the minimal burden of establishing 
that he was regarded as disabled as McCracken has put forth evidence that his 
direct supervisor was aware of McCracken's medical conditions and believed 
that he could not perform the facility audits due to those conditions.
b. Qualified
The second part of a prima facie case of discrimination requires the
plaintiff to prove that she or he is qualified to perform the essential function of
the position, with or without reasonable accommodation.
The determination of whether an employee is qualified to perform 
the essential functions of a job involves a two step inquiry. First the 
employee must show that she meets the necessary prerequisites for 
the job, and then she must demonstrate that she can perform the 
essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. If 
the employee establishes that she cannot perform the essential 
functions of the job without accommodation, she must also make a 
facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible and that
21
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the accommodation will allow her to perform the essential functions 
of the job.
Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 517 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Essential functions are 
"fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a 
disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(1). Evidence of whether a 
particular function is essential includes: the employer's opinion as to which 
functions are essential, written job descriptions, amount of time spent on the job 
performing the function, consequences of not requiring the employee to perform 
the function, terms of a collective bargaining agreement, work experience of 
employees who previously held the job, and/or current work experience. 29
C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(3).
As previously determined, the Court finds that McCracken meets the 
minimum burden of showing that he was qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the position.
c. Adverse Employment Action and Causal 
Connection
The third part of a prima facie case of discrimination requires the plaintiff 
to prove that she or he suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of the
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disability. It is undisputed that McCracken suffered an adverse employment 
action when his employment at Carleton was terminated. When viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to McCracken, the Court determines that the 
record indicates that there is a causal connection because McCracken's 
supervisor believed he could not perform some of his duties due to his physical 
limitations and because, as previously discussed, there are fact questions as to 
the truth and veracity of the Mullen report.
3. Legitimate Non-discriminatory Reason
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate non­
discriminatory reason for its actions. Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 516­
517 (8th Cir. 2003). As previously determined, the Court finds that Carleton has 
proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating McCracken's 
employment.
4. Pretext
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, once an employer 
articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's reason is a pretext for
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discrimination. St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, No. 11-176, 2012 WL 1987874, at *4 
(8th Cir. June 5, 2012).
The parties do not specifically address this point in the context of the 
disability discrimination allegations. As previously determined, however, the 
Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Carleton's 
proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination and therefore the Court 
denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's disability 
discrimination claims.
D. Merits of Retaliation Claims
The ADEA, ADAAA, and the MHRA forbid an employer from retaliating 
against any employee because the employee complained about discrimination. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Minn. Stat. § 363A.15. To establish a 
prima facie claim of retaliation, McCracken must show that: (1) he engaged in 
statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action was taken against 
him; and (3) the materially adverse action was taken in retaliation for him 
engaging in protected activity. Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 
1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (identifying standard for violation of the ADA); Heisler 
v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 n.6 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that claims under
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the MHRA follow the ADA test); Benford v. City of Minneapolis, Civil No. 10­
04539 (ADM/LIB), 2012 WL 6200365, at *8-9 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2012) (identifying 
standard for retaliation in violation of, inter alia, the ADEA, the ADA, and the 
MHRA). The Court applies a McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to 
retaliation claims. See Dixon v. Mount Olivet Careview Home, Civil No. 09-1099 
(MJD/AJB), 2010 WL 3733936, at *7-10 (D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2010).
The Court finds that McCracken has waived his retaliation claims because 
he failed to address these claims in his opposition to Carleton's motion for 
summary judgment. See Anderson v. Durham D & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 515 
n. 2 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore grants summary judgment as to these 
claims.
E. Merits of Whistleblower Claim 
1. Standard
According to the Minnesota Whistleblower Act,
[a]n employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise 
discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the 
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges 
of employment because:
(1) the employee . . . in good faith, reports a violation or suspected 
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law 
to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement
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official . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1. Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis to whistleblower claims filed under this Act. Cokley v. City of
Otsego, 623 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
In order to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff "must show:
(1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse employment
action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two." Id.
(citation omitted). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law or rule that 
the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there is a federal 
or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is implicated by the 
employee's complaint, the employee reported the violation or 
suspected violation in good faith, and the employee alleges facts 
that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted 
pursuant to law.
Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354-55 (Minn. 2002).
2. Prima Facie Case
a. Statutorily Protected Conduct
To engage in statutorily protected conduct, a plaintiff must have "blown 
the whistle" for the protection of the general public, or at least, someone in 
addition to the plaintiff and not just for plaintiff's own rights. Obst v. Microtron,
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Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000). The plaintiff must make the report in 
good faith. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010). In order 
to determine whether a report of a violation or suspected violation of law is 
made in good faith, Minnesota courts examine not only the content of the report, 
but also the reporter's purpose in making the report. Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202. 
The central question is whether the reports were made for the purpose of 
blowing the whistle, i.e., to expose an illegality. Id. Courts look at the reporter's 
purpose at the time the reports were made, not after subsequent events have 
transpired. Id. The employee does not need to identify the specific law that he 
believes was violated, but there must be an actual federal or state law or rule 
implicated by the facts asserted in the employee's complaint. Kratzer v. Welsh 
Cos., 771 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2009). A mere violation of company policy is 
insufficient. Amin v. Flagstone Hospitality Mgmt., LLC, No. 03-1181 (JRT/JSM), 
2005 WL 3054599, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2005). A "report" does not need to be 
made in a formal manner in order to receive whistleblower protection. See Skare 
v. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 515 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court finds that McCracken did not engage in statutorily protected 
conduct. Internal disputes over matters of office and personnel management fail
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to support a whistleblower complaint for want of a violation of law. See Hedglin 
v. City of Willman 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn. 1998). Further, reports made in 
the normal course of an employee's job duties are not statutorily protected 
activity. See Carlson v. Extendicare Health Services, Inc., Civil File No. 05-1438 
(MJD/SRN), 2006 WL 2069254, at *6 (D. Minn. July 26, 2008) ("[E]mployees do not 
engage in protected activity when making reports in the normal course of their 
job duties."); see also Freeman v. Ace Telephone Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1140 (D. Minn. 2005) (holding that CEO was simply doing his job in making 
report because he was responsible for the financial health of the company and 
had a duty to report to the Board any irregularities in the Board's practices).
b. Adverse Employment Action
McCracken claims that Carleton took adverse employment action against 
him. Discharge is an adverse action under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act.
See Anderson v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 2545508, *11 (D. Minn. June 18, 
2010). Carleton does not refute this point.
c. Causal Connection
The causation element may be satisfied "by evidence of circumstances that 
justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as a showing that the employer
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has actual or imputed knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action follows closely in time." Dietrich v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 536 
N.W.2d 319, 327 (Minn. 1995) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that McCracken cannot demonstrate a causal connection 
between any alleged protected activity and the adverse employment action. 
There is no causal connection for Carleton to retaliate against McCracken for the 
report about Strong as McCracken's alleged report occurred in April 2006, which 
was five years before McCracken was discharged from Carleton.
3. Legitimate Non-discriminatory Reason and Pretext 
Because the Court determined that McCracken has not established a prima 
facie case, the Court need not address whether Carleton can proffer a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason or whether that reason is a mere pretext. The Court 
therefore grants summary judgment as to this claim.
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Accordingly, based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Docket 
No. 10] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Dated: August 26, 2013 s/ Michael J. Davis________
Michael J. Davis 
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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